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This paper characterizes the collective bargaining systems in six Latin American countries focusing on their effects on labor market flexibility. 1 The institutional arrangements are analyzed along two dimensions --the degree of centralization (v. decentralization) and the degree of state intervention (v. collective autonomy) --at three levels: collective association, collective bargaining, and conflict resolution. Table A compares the collective bargaining systems of the countries studied. Table B sets forth a list of questions that guided the analysis. Table C provides detailed analysis of the collective bargaining systems. The information summarized in this paper was collected from a review of labor laws, literature and observations by experts in the field.
2 The paper also describes the overall setting within which the collective bargaining systems operate. The paper briefly summarizes arguments on the effects of institutional arrangements on labor market flexibility and economic performance but does not seek to draw conclusions on this relationship.
Section 1: The new setting for collective bargaining in Latin America 3
1 The countries selected (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay) together represent over 70% of the region=s labor force. They offer different industrial relations models, though common characteristics can be drawn.
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Over more than a decade, the collective bargaining systems in Latin America have been exposed to increasing pressures and challenges. During this time, the countries of the region have reoriented their development strategy from state-led industrialization to market oriented growth, and adopted stabilization and/or economic restructuring reforms, including varying degrees of commercial and financial liberalization. These reforms have changed the rules of the game within which businesses, the state and labor interplay. First, opening markets has exposed previously protected firms to new standards of competitiveness. The scale of production has changed from large, vertically-integrated oligopolies protected by tariffs, to smaller nuclear production units. 4 Exploiting advances in technology and innovation and increasing efficiency drive competitiveness strategies (Godio, 1995) .
In the transition to market economies, states are redefining their role as economic agents, shifting responsibility for allocating productive resources, including labor, to the market. Across the region, states have privatized state-owned industries, downsized government structures, and shed government employment. Redefining the state=s role has called into question the Latin American tradition of state guaranteed employment protections and conditions. Within this context the labor market flexibility debate has raged. Flexibilization generally means making work arrangements more 4 flexible to enable firms to adapt to changing economic conditions. 5 There has not been a uniform embrace of flexibilization of the labor market in the region. While some countries have adopted explicit moves in that direction, others have rejected this approach and have reinforced mandated protections. 6 5 This flexibility to adapt can be achieved through different approaches, including, inter alia, labor cost flexibility (adjustment of wage and non-wage costs), employment flexibility (adjusting the size of the workforce or the nature of employment, part time, temporary), work time flexibility (adjusting the hours of the workweek), and functional flexibility (multi-tasking, increasing the mobility of workers within the firm). Lagos (1994) argues that an Aunderground flexibility@ in Latin America has transpired in which the dynamics of the labor market have overwhelmed the labor market institutions. Because of the region=s Ainstitutional lag,@ a dynamic flexibilization has been channeled through a growing informal sector, energetic growth in small enterprises, and downward flexibility in real wages.
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In this new political and economic setting in Latin America, unions= traditional strategy of establishing ties to the state and political parties to obtain legislated protections and redistributive policies is challenged. 7 Members= welfare is progressively seen as emanating from the enterprise and increases in productivity. As a result, collective bargaining as a means to establish formerly mandated employment conditions and protections has gained significance. However, in most of the region, trade union membership is low, as is coverage of collective agreements. Table D provides a summary of industrial relations indicators. Unions face other challenges, including a changing economic landscape, with a transition from large firms to small firms, the ascension of new key industries, the redesign of production strategies, and the decentralization of production (whether through the production process via outsourcing or maquila industries, or geographically through the development of outlying areas, the expansion of MNCs , etc.). They must also accommodate a changing labor market, characterized by a growing informal economy, the feminization of the labor force, and high levels of unemployment (Zapata, 1995) .
Section 2: Conceptual issues
The flexibility debate has predominately centered on the impact mandated employment protections and conditions may have on employment creation and economic performance. Increasingly, the structure of collective bargaining and the role of unions are entering the discussion. The nature and design of collective bargaining systems impact firms = (and at an aggregated level, the economy =s) ability to reallocate resources and adopt productive strategies to fit changing economic conditions. This paper examines the collective bargaining systems along two dimensions that 7 Cortázar et. al. contrast the Aconfrontational@ labor movement and Anon-encompassing elite@ in Latin
America to the Anon-confrontational@ and Aelite encompassing@ experience of East Asia. They argue that Latin America=s poor labor dynamism is partially explained by the rent-seeking behavior of politicized unions which negotiated wage increases over and above the marginal product of labor for a wage-earning cadre. They were able to extract these gains from protected firms operating within an inward-looking development strategy biased against agriculture and exports adopted by the non-encompassing elites. This resulted in higher urban wages in formal sectors, less labor intensive production processes, a highly segmented labor market with poor intersectoral allocation of labor and urban-rural disparities which encouraged migration, exacerbating urban unemployment. In contrast, the East Asian Aelite encompassing@ development strategy in cooperation with (or suppression of ) a Anonconfrontational@ labor movement was labor-demanding and resulted in wage increases and growth in employment (Cortázar, Lustig, and Sabot, 1998) .
6 affect labor market flexibility: the degree of centralization of the systems and the extent of collective autonomy.
Decentralization versus Centralization
A decentralized system in which collective bargaining occurs at the firm or within a more fragmented system is expected to increase flexibility.@ 8
Increasing contractual flexibility can increase productivity by better connecting collective contract provisions to firm conditions and collapsing the distance between situation-specific, firm-based knowledge and production decisions. Plus, liberalizing contracting decisions from blunt industry-, sector-, and economywide bargaining rules (as well as from government regulated employment stipulations) may redirect firms = and workers= attention from redistributive possibilities under these constraints to income generation (Guasch, 1999 citing Heckman, 1997 . 9 Pencavel (1997) argues that decentralized bargaining tempers the union=s ability to effect monopoly wage increases, keeping wages more in line with productivity of the workers in a competitive market. He also argues that it mitigates the resource inefficiencies that often result from the pressure-group activity of higher-level unions (such as populist income policies) and maximizes the beneficial role that unions play as participatory organizations for the workers.
In decentralized structures unions facilitate worker input to firm decision-making and can thereby increase efficiency and productivity (though he also notes it can decrease productivity by resisting new technology or protecting unproductive workers). Decentralized systems can provide greater pluralism of representation and make it more difficult for states to coopt labor movements, assuming that firm-based unions are strong (Pencavel, 1997) .
8 Numhauser-Henning (1993) . Also, Kjell G. Salvanes found in an econometric study that centralized wage bargaining reduced labor market flexibility by reducing the degree of job turnover, though a priori the effect of centralized wage bargaining is unclear (Salvanes, 1997) .
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Decentralized bargaining systems may better internalize the consequences of the wages/employment trade-off.
But extreme decentralization could produce wage drift if there is a total absence of coordination. Calmors and Driffill (1988) argued that the relationship between the centralization of the wage bargaining system and economic performance was U-shaped. On the decentralized end, in competitive markets the firm-based unions would immediately experience the employment effect of a wage increase. On the centralized end, the externalities of a wage increase would be internalized by the union. The industry-wide union structure of bargaining would produce worse wage-employment effects because there would be little competition (i.e. among industries) to check the wage increase, and the increases would be passed on to consumers. In that structure, enough workers would be outside of the industry so as to fail to internalize the costs to all workers of the wage increase.
Recently the OECD 1997 Employment Outlook extended the influential analysis of Calmfors and Driffill on the structure of bargaining and economic performance to cover the years 1986-1996, and examined statistically the correlations between measures of centralization and coordination of bargaining and indicators of economic performance.
The OECD 1997 report found little systematic evidence of a continued U-shaped relationship over the past decade between the country classification of bargaining systems and economic performance. However, it found a fairly robust relationship between cross country differences in earnings inequality and bargaining structures. More centralized systems have significantly less earning inequality compared to more decentralized ones. It also found some tendency for more centralized bargaining systems to have lower unemployment and higher employment rates. (See Table E for a summary of findings on economic performance and the structure of collective bargaining provided in the 1997 study.) Nickell (1997) finds that high unionization and centralized bargaining are associated with higher unemployment. Siebert (1997) and Heckman (1997) show the adverse impact on employment creation of centralized bargaining and high coverage rates, among other labor policies. OECD (1996) finds that over a 15 year period, net private job creation dropped by 1 percent in countries with centralized collective bargaining while it increased in decentralized systems by 30 percent. Cox-Edwards (1996) shows through a simulation model that unemployment would drop by 4 percentage 8 points if Argentina were to decentralize its collective bargaining.
10
10 Guasch (1999) .
There is increasing attention by policy-makers to the merits of decentralized bargaining. The OECD 1994 Jobs Study recommended that to increase wage and labor cost flexibility, the industrialized countries Arefocus sectoral collective bargaining to framework agreements which leave enterprises free to respond flexibly to market trends, provided they adhere to overall standards; phase out the practice of administrative extension of agreements which impose inflexible conditions; and introduce >opening clauses= which allow higher level collective agreements to be renegotiated at a lower level.@ Nonetheless, evidence of the relationship between indicators of economic performance and collective bargaining is mixed, and there is no clearly preferred industrial relations structure.
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Many factors determine the degree of centralization of a collective bargaining system, including: the type of unions in which workers organize (firm-based, industry-wide, national unions) the level at which bargaining occurs (firmbased, multi-firm, industry-wide, national agreements), the degree of coordination between different bargaining units, 11 the use of extension mechanisms (through which workers or employers who are not members of the bargaining parties are covered by an agreement), and systems of consolidated representation (where, despite the existence of many unions, one union has a monopoly of representation). Tri-partite bargaining is also a mechanism by which bargaining is extended to large sectors of the economy and can play an important role in advancing economic and labor reforms. (See Table   B for some analytic questions regarding the structure of collective bargaining systems.)
Autonomy versus State Intervention
Increasing autonomy in collective bargaining systems can increase flexibility if it expands the subject and process by which employers and workers directly negotiate and helps the parties to internalize the costs and benefits of their negotiations. Nonetheless, states have frequently curtailed collective autonomy in the name of flexibility (for example, by restricting bargaining or derogating collective agreements).
11 Co-ordination refers to Athe extent to which the different bargaining levels are integrated so as to prevent them from mutually blocking their respective purposes.@ It is achieved through pattern (follow-the-leader) bargaining (OECD, 1994b, 171) .
State intervention can take many forms and can serve different purposes, both promoting and restricting collective bargaining. It can promote syndical activity by protecting union leaders and members, by mandating leave for union activities, by establishing employers= duty to bargain, and guaranteeing workers= rights to information in bargaining. However, states can also intervene to control union formation, bargaining, and conflict resolution.
Intervention at any point distorts the autonomy throughout the industrial relations system. Who bargains, what provisions can be negotiated, and what happens when bargaining strikes a dead end are all important in determining the consequences of a given bargaining structure. When bargaining fails, strikes and conflict resolution procedures are generally triggered. In both bargaining and conflict resolution, the potential for direct negotiations and the extent to which the contracting parties internalize the consequences of their actions are critical. Systems are distinguished by whether conciliation and/or arbitration is voluntary or mandatory, and whether rules connect real wage offers with strikes and strikers replacement or whether strikes are subject to statutory but arbitrary state intervention (See Table B ).
Section 3: Characterizing the sample
Collective bargaining systems in Latin America differ greatly. Although most are characterized by pervasive state intervention, the forms and degrees of intervention vary, as do their objectives. In some countries, the state has intervened to centralize regimes through a tight corporatist framework, such as in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
Uruguay is also centralized but is unique for its Aunregulated@ system since the repeal of the restrictive syndical legislation in that country in 1985. Mexico is also special case because it is categorized as centralized even though firmlevel unions predominate. In that country, centralization in bargaining is achieved through coordination, a disciplined syndical hierarchy, and the state=s coopting of the official labor movement. In contrast, state intervention in Chile and Peru has encouraged decentralized systems. Chile=s system is highly regulated in process but is considered only Aquasiinterventionist@ because it allows considerable autonomy of the parties in direct negotiations. Peru=s Aautonomized@ union movement is attributed to high state intervention as well as the prevalence of small firms. The registration of unions also has been a main control over union life in Peru. However, in this case the state has intervened to maintain a highly decentralized system with weak unions. Registration of unions, federations, and confederations with the Labor Ministry were required for these organizations to acquire legal status. The decision to register was often arbitrary and subject to political manipulation. This problem was addressed in a 1992 law which states that unions cannot be denied registration if they meet the legal requirements for organization (Villavicencio, 1993) .
The cases of Argentina, Mexico and Peru demonstrate that pluralism in association does not necessarily lead to pluralistic representation. This is not the case of Brazil, in which only one union, which has sole representative power, is allowed in a given category. In Chile, more than one union may exist in an enterprise and more than one union may represent workers in collective bargaining. In fact, Chilean law discourages any form of closed shop or Amost representative@ privileges (Romaguera, Echevarría, and González, 1995) . Uruguay is notable for the absence of state intervention in defining its union life. However, the pluralism of representation is affected by the Amost representative@ criteria, which are of the few legal provisions affecting collective labor relations. However, they are not applied systematically.
The return from authoritarian to democratic regimes in many of the countries has greatly expanded the protection of the freedom of association, collective bargaining, and strike as it has improved the protections for other human, civil, and political rights. Table F lists the ILO conventions protecting collective activity ratified in the region.
Up until the last decade, claims before the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association of the suspension or dissolution of unions in Latin America and in more extreme cases, the intimidation, incarceration, torture or death of union leaders were not uncommon. Not only were such acts of intimidation allowed by the state, in some cases they were perpetrated by it. While such brutal forms of persecution are now uncommon, there continue to be claims of more subtle forms of anti-union activity, the most frequent of which is the firing of firm-based union organizers or the denial of registration of the unions by the ministers of labor. It is argued that these more subtle forms of anti-union behavior are encouraged by inadequate legal frameworks to prohibit them (Bronstein, 1993) .
Section 4: Country profiles
The following country profiles illustrate that, although some generalizations can be drawn from the countries studied, the institutional design of their collective bargaining systems varies dramatically. The resulting system is highly centralized, with unions and collective agreements largely coalescing by activity or profession. Agreements meeting specified criteria can be sanctioned (homologated) by the Labor Ministry, making them applicable to all workers, be they affiliated or not, in the defined territory. This tool is used by the government to stipulate conditions in the agreements, such as including references to use of technology or productivity, and involves a review of agreements for their impact on the economy and on consumers. The 1994 Constitution also grants the Executive the power to rescind collective agreements for economic emergency. The resolution of collective conflicts is also highly regulated, including mandatory conciliation prior to any direct action. By law, a system of voluntary and mandatory arbitration has been established, thought the Ministry of Labor can intervene at every juncture in the process.
Brazil=s collective labor system is considered a Amonopoly in transition. at the regional and industrial levels, slowly increasing their role in wage determination of different groups of workers, making wage determination less synchronized. 13 Both unions= and employers= organizations are promoting a trend toward decentralization of the collective bargaining process. While the system does not appear to provide for direct negotiations at any juncture, there is a trend toward negotiations at the firm level.
Chile=s collective labor relations system is pluralistic and decentralized. The collective bargaining and conflict resolution process is regulated in detail in terms of time limits, alternative approaches, etc., but grants considerable autonomy in direct negotiations to the parties to help resolve their conflicts. The law favors union pluralism, discouraging the recognition of special faculties and privileges to Amost representative organizations.@ It allows several unions to exist for a given firm (with some requirements on number of members) and allows more than one union or groups of workers to engage in collective bargaining. Although Chile requires the registration of unions, unions do not need prior authorization to establish themselves. Until 1991, only firm level negotiation was allowed. Thereafter, multifirm bargaining was established with the prior consent of the parties. Nevertheless, the Constitution continues to protect only firm-level negotiations. The Constitution tends to prefer protection of negative freedom of association: it provides that membership is voluntary and that no worker may be forced to affiliate, to dis-affiliate or be prevented from disaffiliation. It also prohibits groups from striking more clearly than it establishes that right. Some argue that the degree of decentralization of Chile=s system is excessive, that it weakens unions, and limits the coverage of collective agreements. 14 Recent reforms may be seen as a response to this concern.
Mexico is noted for its strong corporatist system permeated by extra-legal state intervention within an already legally interventionist system. The main point of entry for state intervention is the registration of unions. Most unions 13 Carneiro and Henley (1998) 15 In 1997, eight of 47 union federations broke away from the CTM to form an alternative organization to represent labor at the national level, the Union Nacional De Trabajadores (UNT). The formation of the UNT gives cohesion and political clout to the independent labor movement. Comprised of unions with diverse political orientation, it attracts members discontent with the CTM and represents a threat to its longstanding supremacy. 15 Bensusán argues that the subordination of corporatist unions to the state and to employers is reflected in the fact that the structural adjustment reforms were disproportionately borne by workers despite highly protective labor legislation. This Acorporatist flexibility@ is also seen in the social pacts which, though instrumental in advancing Mexico=s economic reforms, are criticized for signing away workers= wage increases. She argues that Mexico=s social peace will be jeopardized if labor market reform to Aflexibilize@ employment conditions are not accompanied by reforms to remove the current restrictions on union freedom, as well as judicial reform to prevent continued state intervention in union activity (Bensusán, 1993) .
Mexico=s corporatist structure is preserved by the state=s notorious denial of the registration of Aopposition@ unions, which prevents their representatives from participating in collective bargaining or strikes. It is also strengthened by the unitary system of representation (in which the union with the majority of members in a firm represent all workers) and the use of separation and exclusion clauses. These clauses allow only members of the signatory union to be hired by a firm. Workers who disaffiliate must be fired. Collective autonomy is also circumvented by the practice of Acontracts of protection,@ in which employers sign agreements that provide minimum benefits to satisfy the Aduty to contract@ and avoid entering into substantive negotiations. The state intervenes in collective bargaining and conflict resolution through the tri-partite conciliation and arbitration boards, which are subordinate to and politically dependent on the Executive. In addition to supporting the resolution of economic conflicts, these councils resolve disputes regarding 16 registration of unions and their right to negotiate exclusively. Another common form of state intervention is declaring a strike Anon-existent@ and, in more extreme cases, declaring the striking entity in bankruptcy, causing the termination of individual and collective contracts.
Peru=s collective bargaining system is noted for its firm-based structure (97.42% are firm-based unions, compared to 2.4% industry wide) and acute state intervention. Bargaining is decentralized. Parties are free to choose the level of bargaining, but the large majority of agreements are signed at the firm-level. If parties disagree on the level, agreements are negotiated at the firm. The system was reformed in 1992, increasing direct negotiation and conflict resolution by relaxing the collective negotiation process, introducing voluntary arbitration as an alternative to state administrative decision, and eliminating state approval of agreements. Prior to the reform, the collective bargaining process was very rigid and trial-like, designed for resolution by administrative decision. Nonetheless, the state can still intervene in the bargaining process and can mandate conciliation and arbitration if strikes threaten firms = or sectors= economic viability. The 1992 reform also increased collective autonomy by protecting unions= right to registration. As in Mexico, the registration of unions has been a main control over union life in Peru. Prior to the 1992 Collective Labor
Relations Law, there were no safeguards to the associative rights of unions. For unions, federations, and confederations to acquire legal personality, they had to register with the Labor Ministry and the decision to register was often arbitrary and subject to political manipulation. The 1992 law defends those rights by stating that unions cannot be denied registration if they meet the legal requirements. The 1992 reform also increased union pluralism by allowing more than one union to exist in a firm. However, the most representative union continues to have a monopoly over representation.
Uruguay=s collective labor relations are characterized by an absence of any institutional framework --they are, by and large, Aunregulated.@ The system, however, is centralized. 
Section 5: Trends and convergence
Despite the variance in collective bargaining systems across the region, some experts see a pattern of convergence between decentralized and centralized systems and autonomous and interventionist regimes (Goldin, 1993a) .
For example, in Argentina, a country noted for its highly centralized system, a 1991 decree allowed parties to modify the level of negotiations. It was later decided that if parties could not agree on the level of negotiations, the Labor Minister should favor the more decentralized level. In contrast, Chile, a highly decentralized regime, reformed its system to allow multi-enterprise bargaining for the first time since 1973. It also legalized the existence of workers= centrals. The move towards multi-employer bargaining was taken to try to increase the low coverage rates of collective agreements.
17 16 In their analysis of the effects of reunionization in Uruguay, Allen, Cassoni and Labadie (1996) find that, with the return to collective bargaining in Uruguay, wages increased in all industries, and even more so in unionized industries. Employment and hours worked increased in nonunion industries, thought they did not change in union industries. Wages became more compressed and less responsive to macroeconomic conditions.
There is also movement toward collective autonomy, creating some convergence along that dimension.
However, it is less apparent since all countries except Uruguay and, to some extent, Chile have interventionist systems.
Much progress in this regard has been made in the public sector. Few countries by law deny public employees the right to organize. In Argentina, collective bargaining by public employees was allowed and regulated in 1992. In 1994, Chile=s civil servants gained the right to establish associations. Collective autonomy has also advanced in other arenas. In
Brazil, the 1988 Constitution prohibited state intervention in union approval or administration. It also provided for private voluntary arbitration as an alternative to the dissidio and upheld collective bargaining as the only mechanism to worsen employment conditions. Peru also expanded its collective autonomy by encouraging private voluntary conciliation and making more flexible the conciliation process. In Argentina, new contract forms provided by the 1991 National
Employment Act could only be adopted through collective bargaining.
Despite these initiatives for reform, the collective bargaining systems are slow to change. In Chile, the Constitution only protects firm-level bargaining and the process for multi-enterprise bargaining is considered too restrictive. State intervention prevails, even in those countries that have sought to increase autonomy. For example, in Brazil, much of the intervention formerly conducted by the state is maintained through the Labor Court's enforcement of interventionist laws. And intervention in negotiations continues. In 1994, the Brazilian Minister of Labor refused wage increases negotiated in the Sao Paulo auto industry because they infringed upon the objectives of the economic adjustment program recently launched. And recently in Argentina, the government repealed freely negotiated clauses in collective agreements in public enterprises to facilitate their privatization (Bronstein, 1995) .
One of the more notable trends in the region is the increased impetus for social consultation and tri-partite bargaining. With the growth of democracy in the face of structural reforms, states have engaged in social consultation in an effort to maintain their presence in labor relations and encourage social cohesion and acceptance of reform. It played an important role in the return to democracy in Chile and Uruguay. Pactos Sociales, establishing guidelines for wage increases, were critical to controlling inflation and restructuring Mexico=s economy. However, these pacts are criticized for being state-imposed rather that resulting from a truly consultative process (Bronstein, 1995) . In 1995, in response to the economic crisis, the Mexican government negotiated with business and labor, a series of price and wage pacts to help stabilize the economy. More recently it negotiated the 1996 New Labor Culture agreement which provided a series of guidelines to raise salaries in line with increases in productivity (Oxford Analytica, 1998) . See Table G for a summary of recent examples of social consultation.
Section 6: Implications and reflections
The economic and political reforms adopted over more than a decade have changed the rules of the game in which business, the state, and labor operate. Just as businesses and states are redefining their roles, so must unions define a modus operandi to operate effectively in their changing environment. However, they are not starting from a clean slate. Collective labor relations in Latin America are characterized by pervasive state intervention with the notable exception of Uruguay. Historically, states have repressed collective bargaining while emphasizing legislated individual employment protections and guarantees. In some countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, union activity was encouraged but only in as much as it reinforced the corporatist system. Union dependence on state intervention has opened the door to intervention at all stages of the collective labor relations (in varying degrees by country): in the organization of unions, in the negotiation process, and in the resolution of conflicts.
Active labor intervention by states combined with weak unions resulted in a union strategy, which, in general, has been a political one. Unions have tried to gain access to the state in order to achieve better employment conditions and protection (and sometimes redistributive income policies) for its members. Despite low union density in the region, unions have been immensely important in the labor movement in Latin America, mainly through policy making. The tradeoff of this strategy was declining union influence in the sphere of collective bargaining and representation. This asymmetrical voice in bargaining and access to state intervention may explain why the region has one of the highest strike records in the world (See Table D ).
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Recent political and economic reforms have made the role of unions increasingly important. Nonetheless, they remain weak. Membership and the coverage of collective agreements are low. To a large degree, the blanket provision of benefits through labor laws, constitutions, and, in some cases, extension of agreements, have taken away incentives for members to organize in unions. This disincentive for workers to organize has been compounded when coopted unions focus on political patronage as opposed to their constituencies= welfare. Union membership is further strained by a growing informal economy and an increasingly segmented labor market. The region=s low collective agreement coverage rates reflects that the collective bargaining systems are, on the whole, very fragmented and decentralized. In Reforms she cites include: allowing firm-level bargaining, expanding the scope of negotiable items, making union representation contestable, extending the freedom to organize unions, and reforming labor laws to internalize the costs of labor disputes, confining them to the parties involved (Cox Edwards, 1997, 128) .
Reforms to protect freedom of association and union activity and to strengthen collective autonomy may be necessary to energize this new unionism, and may be necessary corollaries to Aflexibilizing@ the labor systems. This includes establishing employers= duty to bargain, protecting workers= rights to information in bargaining, and promoting collect bargaining activity. Protecting the right to collective action may also require a dismantling of tightly corporatist systems to increase pluralism of representation. 
Mexico
Degree of centralization achieved through corporatist structure and union discipline; high state intervention Main intervention through state registration of unions and in strikes. Independent or opposition unions outside the corporatist structure frequently not registered and strikes suppressed. Exclusion and separation clauses maintain system. Bargaining autonomy circumvented by unions who satisfy duty to sign by signing minimum agreements (Acontracts of protection@). State intervenes in conflict resolution through conciliation and arbitration boards and by declaring strikes non-existent. Negotiation process not highly regulated, but integrated with conflict resolution (usually occurs in conciliation) in which there is high state intervention.
Different types of unions allowed, though most firm-level. Union with majority represents all workers in firm. Highly disciplined syndical movements achieve coordination in bargaining. Industry-wide law contracts must be approved by labor ministry, but few signed. Tri-partite bargaining and pactos sociales play integral role in the adjustment process and recovery from economic crisis. Employers have a qualified duty to negotiate at firm level only. They also have a duty to share necessary information with the unions to fulfill their bargaining duties.
Peru
1973-1991 collective bargaining restricted to enterprise level. 1991 system reformed to allow multi-enterprise bargaining w/prior agreement by parties, but considered too restrictive and no duty to bargain at this level. Mainly reformed because low coverage of collective agreements (1993 only 10% workers covered).
Mexico
Negotiation process of collective contract not regulated, though agreements must be revised at least every 2 years. Bargaining usually occurs in conciliation proceedings after workers exercise right to strike. Although it is customary for workers to call a strike in anticipation of revising a contract it is not required. Because bargaining and conflict resolution procedures are integrated (and state intervenes in conflict resolution) state intervention permeates the bargaining process. Negotiation of industry-wide Law Contracts is highly regulated and state intervention is clearly defined.
Employers have duty to contract: if an employer employs unionized workers and they request a collective agreement, the employer must bargain and sign an agreement. Some employers get around this by signing with a puppet union Acontracts of protection@ which satisfy procedural requirements but offer no more than minimum standards set by law. Only way union can challenge this is to establish that it represents majority of workers and should have negotiated the agreement.
Firm level negotiations are common. Collective agreements: 1+ unions and 1+ employers; law contracts: compulsory and cover all unions and employers in given category and territory --not very common. Firm level internal regulations and direct negotiations common through mixed boards.
Peru
Regulated, but reformed in 1992 to be less so. Pre-1992, process was similar to trial and integrated with conflict resolution processes over which labor ministry presided. Post reform: unions present employer with proposal (or labor authority if activity level). Negotiations must occur w/10 days of presentation and carried out according to parties. Committee must be formed with equal representation. Conflict can stand unresolved or parties can opt for arbitration or strike.
Duty to negotiate; parties must meet within 10 days. Workers= have a right to information about the economic and financial and social conditions of the firm.
Parties select level of negotiations by mutual agreement, if no consensus, defaults at firm level. If agreement already exists, then substitute or complementary agreement can only be negotiated at other level if mutual agreement to do so, can=t be done by admin or arbitral decision. Internal labor regulations govern the internal operations of firm and are mandatory for firms w/100 or more workers. These must be approved by labor authority.
Uruguay
No. There is no general duty to bargain, no collective bargaining procedures, no regulations on level of agreements, their substance or duration. An underlying and mutual faith that agreements will be abided by underlies the system. System of tripartite negotiations (Consejos) were resurrected after 1985 return to democracy, but ceased in 1990 to encourage bilateral negotiations.
No duty to bargain. Collective agreements can be signed at firm, multi-firm, or industry level depending on the level of the bargaining union. However, an outgrowth of the Consejos, most bilateral negotiations occur at sectoral/industry level through the Amost representative union@, federation, or group of unions. Bargaining at the firm level often supplements general agreements to fit peculiarities of firm, ie. job stability, new technology.
Country Is the content of negotiations restricted? Do contract terms expire with contract? Can negotiations worsen contract terms or legal minimums?
Argentina Prior to 1991 not restricted though topics were suggested; subsequently, required that agreements include incorp of new technology, training systems, classification systems, link productivity and wages, information and consultative mechanisms, etc. Later held that agreements would only be homologated if took into account criteria of productivity, investment, new technology, and professional development.
Provisions continue beyond the life of agreement if new contract not entered into (ultraactividad). Hence, unions often reluctant to negotiate. 1990 decree revoked carry over provisions making it possible to negotiate new agreements for privatized state owned enterprises. 1995 law provides that collective agreement provisions specific to small businesses no longer have force 3 months after expiration unless negotiated otherwise. As of 1997, 85% of agreements had lapsed but clauses remained in effect due to ultraactividad.
A collective agreement can worsen benefits provided in a previous agreement.
Brazil
Maximum duration 2 years. Much of content is already established by law since Constitution and labor codes noted for setting minimum standards for most conditions (workdays, holidays, vacations, wages).
It is in debate whether provisions not replaced by another agreement continue to have force ( ultraactividad).
1988 Constitution provides that salaries and workday can only be reduced through collective negotiation and not through labor courts. Only through mutual agreement can parties reduce or revoke benefits they have established in prior contracts.
Chile
Can include any issue relating to compensation or other benefits and working conditions, but can=t limit employer=s ability to organize, control and administer the firm, or restrict the production, planning or management of the enterprise. Contract has to be 2 years minimum.
Collective contracts must proclaim that other benefits and conditions included in previous contracts are null and void.
Agreements cannot violate existing statutory norms or labor contracts. 1995 proposal that firms with more than 100 workers could negotiate with union the suspension of work relations, reduction of workday or modification of working arrangement for economic or technological reasons.
Mexico
Law requires that collective agreements include names, addresses of the employers, the businesses and establishments it covers, its duration, the work day schedule, leave, vacation, salaries, training of personnel. Only critical element in reality is salaries. Can also include formation of mixed boards, and separation and exclusion clauses.
Collective agreements terminated by mutual consent, at expiration of job, or going out of business of establishment. If no petition to revise, agreement extended for period equal to original term. Law Contracts end by mutual consent or failure to agree to revise. Appears that provisions of coll agreements continue after they expire unless revised b/c provisions are incorporated into individual contracts.
No contracts can reduce benefits established by law. Collective agreements cannot negotiate worse conditions than those in existing contracts, but employers can petition to revise agreements to worsen benefits upon expiration. In economic conflicts, conciliation and arbitration boards can reduce personnel, salaries, work conditions as long as meets legal minimum standards.
Peru
Scope of domestic legislation provides ample workers= protection so little room in collective bargaining. Nonetheless, includes remunerations, working conditions, productivity (explicit reference to in 1992), as well as leave and other forms of promoting union activity, which were established by law pre-1992, but now left to collective agreements. Collective agreement must last min 1 year.
Provisions of collective agreements no longer have effect once agreement expires unless some provisions were agreed to be permanent or extended.
Neither collective conventions nor administrative resolution can reduce the benefits and conditions provided workers by law or regulation. Collective agreements can reduce benefits collectively bargained, though these cannot be reduced by administrative decision.
Uruguay Not regulated. Usually provisions cover min wages by job category, wage adjustment procedures, working condition, work day, adoption of new technologies, etc. Duration of contract usually 1 year.
Traditional doctrine asserts that most beneficial collective contract provisions have effect after expiration or replacement by other contract. Contrary doctrine claims that clauses expire with old contract and thus have no force or can be worsened.
In debate whether an agreement can worsen conditions of previous contract b/c principle of preserving and surpassing establishes that the norm most favorable and the condition most beneficial govern.
Country Is there pluralism of representation? Can workers represent themselves in negotiations?
Who is covered by collective agreements?
Argentina No, system euphemistically characterized as Aunion pluralism with unitary representation@ but state grants personería gremial(PG) which confers monopoly on bargaining, strikes, administering social security programs, and political processes. The Amost representative@ criteria criticized as not very objective since data on union membership is self-proclaimed. Also, Amost rep@ union may be Amost rep@ at the macro level, while another union may be Amost rep@at the firm level.
No, union with personería gremial represents affiliated and nonaffiliated workers. Constitution guarantees union=s right to collective bargaining.
If agreement homologated then covers all workers in area of signatory union, binding on all respective employers. If not, employer decides if covers non-affiliated workers Brazil No, while more than 1 union can exist in a given professional category, only 1 has representative power. Criteria for most representative union: number of members, social welfare services provided, value of property and assets.
Rarely. 1988 Constitution affirmed that collective bargaining can only be conducted through unions (though employers can represent selves in firm agreements). However, if no union or federation or confederation exists to represent unions they can represent selves. 1988 Constitution moved towards direct negotiation by providing that workers of any enterprise with more than 200 employees have right to 1 elected representative to promote direct negotiation with employer.
Collective conventions cover all workers in corresponding profession and all firms in economic category in the geographic area. Collective agreements only cover the firm(s) in which the workers pertain to the professional category of the signatory union, though employers generally extend provisions to non-member workers of the same profession.
Chile Yes. Law discourages Amost representative unions@. Several unions can exist in a given establishment and each can negotiate their own agreement.
Groups of workers can represent themselves. However, workers of enterprises with less than 16 employees do not meet the membership requirements for collective bargaining, or of enterprises with less than 1 year of operation.
Collective contracts only cover union=s members at signing of the contract; employer may extend benefits to all firm workers by mutual consent ( but it then must deduct 75% of monthly union dues from those non-members) Or 6 months after joining firm, new workers can negotiate their own agreement.
Mexico
No. Union with majority signs collective agreement, has exclusive representation in firm. If more than 1 union (of same type or different levels) one with more members negotiates. Guild unions can negotiate jointly or with other types of unions.
Workers cannot represent themselves in collective bargaining agreement. Though they can enter into negotiations with employer, the agreement doesn=t carry right to strike.
Collective agreement is extended to union=s members and current and future workers of signing employer. Law contracts are compulsory to all unions (and workers) and employers in corresponding category.
Peru
Yes. Pre-1992, only 1 union allowed in workplace, had monopoly of repres and collective agreements have erga omnes effect. Post reform, more pluralistic b/c more than one union per firm (often 1 for workers, 1 for employees) allowed, but monop repres maintained for Amost representative union,@ union with majority members. If more than 1 union have to coop to achieve majority must agree on how to divide representation (if proportional, etc.) Workers can represent selves if there is not a union to represent them. In this case, absolute majority elects 2 representatives.
If union members are absolute majority of firm, then agreement is applicable to all workers (incl. subsequently hired workers), if not, only applies to affiliated members. If agreement is at activity level, and unions and employers represent majority in the industry, the agreement has erga omnes effect. Employers may hire replacement workers on 1st day of strike if last offer contained at least equal provisions of original contract readjusted acc to law; on 15th day after final offer presented if it is corrected to meet criteria above; or 15th day after strike. Workers not paid, can seek temporary work, can reintegrate workforce between 15-30 days of strike depending on final offer. If 50%+ workers return to work, strike ends.
1980 Constitution and 1989 Law prohibits public servants as well as people who work in corporations or enterprises operating public utilities or with financial links to the state or whose services or products significantly affect the provision of public needs to strike. Three ministries annually identify the branches of activity fitting these circumstance.
Mexico
Conciliation and arbitration boards can declare strikes Anonexistent@ unless strike claims legal purposes (to achieve balance between forces of production, celebrate collective or law contract, demand fulfillment of contract, revise salaries, fulfill profitsharing); is supported by majority employees; presents petitions to employer via authority establishing terms of strike. Declared illegal if majority workers execute violent acts, in times of war, or continue to strike after declared Anon-existent@. Union must give 6 days notice (10 days for public services). The Constitution guarantees workers= right to strike but in practice it is a union right.
If strike legally Aexistent@ then all employment contracts suspended. However, strikers can=t be fired or replaced. They can quit strike at any time. Workers not paid wages replacement during strike unless board rules conflict is imputable to the employer.
Strikes in public services limited to general and systematic violation of rights granted by Constitution. Must be supported by 2/3 dependencia and declared legal by Tribunal Federal de Conciliación y Arbitraje. Essential services not specifically addressed in law, but need 10 days notice if strike in specific services, also maintenance of services during strike in enterprises dealing with ships, airplanes, trains, hospitals, sanatoriums, clinics, etc. State has intervened via administrative procedure, declaring bankruptcy, alleging crime of social dissolution to striking workers, declaring confiscation.
Peru
With 1992 reform, right to strike more systematically regulated.
To be admissible majority of workers must vote to strike and strike must support proper objectives. Labor authority can declare illegal if strike occurs even though ruled inadmissable, involves violence against people or goods, fails to provide minimum service, occurs after conflict ended by arbitral decision. This is a worker =s right.
Workers can=t be replaced, they don=t receive compensation, though they continue to accrue seniority. Once strike declared, none of the workers (except indispensable workers) can work until strike ended.
Uruguay
The only condition for a legal strike is strikers= giving 7 days fore-warning, but even this provision not really followed in practice and carries no real repercussion. It is debated whether the right to strike is a union right. In practice workers can declare a strike against the wishes of their union.
Wages aren=t paid though seniority is maintained and leave accrues. Generally, resistance to acknowledging public sector right to strike. Public authorities empowered to compel workers to provide minimum operation of essential services (through emergency shifts and use of goods and hiring labor) to ensure continuity of vital services, defined by Labor Office. These laws annulled but provisions still invoked by government. 
Country

Mexico
Admin authority determines whether law contract should be negotiated and must approve law contract for it to be valid. Not clear whether conciliation and arbitration boards can reject agreements submitted.
Conciliation and arbitration (C&A) boards have equal representation of workers, employers and chaired by govt rep. Workers= union may submit conflict to arbitration before these boards. Employer may refuse to submit to arbitration. Arbitration of economic conflicts before C&A boards similar to trial with stages of fact gathering, hearings, and submission of evidence. In arbitral award of economic conflicts, C&A board can increase or decrease the number of persons employed, the daily and weekly hours of work and wages, and more generally, alter conditions of employment in the enterprise or establishment.
State has unlimited capacity to intervene in disputes which concern it, though not by law. 
Brazil
Social consultation hasn=t played a great role in Brazil due to history of authoritarian rule. Successive attempts in mid-80s with transition to democracy failed. The incompatibility of workers= demands and the government=s stabilization and economic programs frustrated efforts.
Chile
New stage of consultation in the 1990's. 1990 tri-partite agreement AChile: An Historic Opportunity@ signed by government, Unitarian Workers Central and Confederation of Production and Commerce, recognizing importance of social dialogue, identifying important policy measures, reflected change in position by unions re private firm and competitive markets as factors for growth, and aided in democratic transition. Success of the consultation resulted in additional agreements and was instrumental in the swift reform of the labor laws. 
Mexico
Peru
Social consultation not successful in Peru, despite several efforts in the 1980s, culminating with establishment the of Consejo Nacional de Concertación by the Fujimori government. Reasons given for the failure of social consultation is the heterogeneity and disunity in the country, the weakness of labor movement, and a lack of attention to consensus by current government. Although the confederations or workers= centrals in Peru historically have been unable to consolidate power, recently they have made efforts and in 1991 formed a committee to coordinate activities.
Uruguay
Social consultation played important role in the transition to democracy. The 1985 Concertación Nacional Programática, a consultative process between the four main political parties, the trade unions, employers= organizations, and student and human rights organizations was a unique process because it was programmatic, not designed to be immediately applied but intended to achieve basic agreements to guide the next government=s political, social and economic agenda --none of the parties to the consultation were part of the existing government --and representation in the process was wide-spread. Social consultation has not continued to play an important role, largely due to the labor movement=s strong opposition to the government=s economic policies. Wage councils ( Consejos de Salarios) were reconvened with some modification in 1985 and served as artifacts of tri-partite cooperation. State used its presence to control wage increases in collective agreements. In 1990, this form of intervention was prohibited and Consejos became purely voluntary.
Source: author=s analysis
